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1. Introduction 
Several recent studies have shown that agricultural market access is one of the 
most important issues on the Doha development-round agenda (e.g. Anderson, 2004; 
Bouët et al 2004b; Francois et al. 2002, 2003; World Bank, 2003) This paper 
discusses access to agricultural markets from the perspective of developing countries 
(DCs). An often-heard view maintains that economic development in DCs is 
hampered by blocked market access in OECD countries. Opening OECD markets will 
lead to prosperity in DCs. On the other hand, DCs have already liberalized, often 
under structural adjustment programmes, and should be given the flexibility to protect 
their rural population against the evils of the global economy. This paper challenges 
this view, and concludes that market access into OECD countries is indeed an 
important issue for some DCs but more rational trade policies by DCs themselves can 
make an even bigger contribution to economic development on those regions. 
Furthermore, further multilateral reduction of tariffs does not automatically lead to 
rising agricultural exports from DCs. Existing preferential schemes already provide 
exporters from DCs lower tariff rates, and a multilateral reduction will not further 
improve the access conditions. Besides, the increased prevalence of import 
restrictions related to sanitary and phytosanitary measures lower the potential gains 
from reduced tariffs and expanded quota. 
The paper first provides a review of existing conventional trade barriers (tariffs 
and quota), but also focuses attention to new forms of impediments to market access. 
Food safety related standards are becoming increasingly important in international 
trade in food products. At the same time, public regulation assumes a relatively minor 
role compared to private (self-) regulation by internationally operating food chains. 
 Furthermore, it is argued that ‘market access’ should not be confined to access 
to industrialised countries. Integration of the rural population in DCs into a market 
economy is far from complete and can provide enormous opportunities for the 
improvement of livelihoods. At the same time, it is clear that increased food 
production, growing populations and rapid urban expansion lead to higher claims on 
natural resources for domestic and industrial use. Especially in fragile ecological areas 
this process can lead to a downward spiral that undermines the natural resource base 
and hence endangers the livelihoods of current and future generations. While market-
based solutions to these challenges are not always available, greater economic 
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prosperity allows countries to better cope with these challenges. The concept of 
market access needs to be broadened beyond the narrow definition of reducing both 
conventional (tariffs and quota) and new (standards) barriers to international trade and 
needs to include access to local and national markets in developing countries. Finally, 
the paper argues that the multilateral agreements and the legal framework of the WTO 
can play a catalysing role in this process of improving -broadly defined- market 
access. 
 
2. The policy landscape after the Uruguay Round 
Tariff negotiations in the GATT/WTO have generally been based on tariff 
bindings, or schedules of concessions tabled under GATT rules that define a 
maximum or ceiling rate for trade restrictions. The coverage and level of these 
bindings is an important element of the initial conditions for the negotiations. While 
tariffs in the OECD (and Latin America) are generally bound, many Asian and 
African economy tariffs remain unbound despite more than a four-fold increase in the 
coverage of developing-country tariff bindings in the Uruguay Round.  
 With the implementation of Uruguay Round commitments, average ad 
valorem tariffs in the industrial countries generally are around 3 percent. However, 
there are important exceptions.  One of these is textiles and clothing, where the 
average rate is roughly three times this overall average.  The other exception is 
agriculture, which we discuss more thoroughly below.  
As in the case of industrial tariffs, the stage for any future agriculture 
negotiations was also set by the Uruguay Round outcome - this time by the Uruguay 
Round Agreement on Agriculture (URAA).  One key difference from industrial 
products is that essentially all agricultural tariffs are bound.  
For both industrial tariffs and agricultural tariffs, the phenomenon that bound 
rates exceed applied rates, or ‘binding overhang’ (Francois and Martin, 2003) is an 
important element for the initial negotiations in the Doha round. The binding 
overhang may reduce the effectiveness of bound tariff reductions. For example, 
Francois et al (2003) show that, in general, for developing countries, binding 
overhang is large enough that reductions in the range of 50% are necessary to force 
any reductions at all in average applied rates for countries like Brazil.   
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3. What do we know about agricultural market access? 
Countries protect their domestic markets in a number of ways. The resulting pattern of 
protection measures is often complex and faces the exporter with an non-transparent 
administrative burden, involving tariffs, quota, technical standards, sanitary and 
phytosanitary standards, import licenses, infrastructure charges, and, increasingly 
popular after the UR, anti-dumping duties. All these measures tend to raise the 
domestic price in of the imported good above its ‘world’ price, i.e. the price that the 
exporter actually receives.   
 
Tariffs 
Tariffs are the most commonly applied form of import protection, and 
negotiations on tariffs have a long history in the GATT and the WTO. While tariffs on 
industrial goods in OECD countries have been subject to negotiated reductions since 
the 1950s, agricultural tariffs have only been included in the multilateral agreements 
since the conclusion of the Uruguay Round in 1994. Agriculture is also somewhat 
special since the use of non-ad valorem tariffs is widespread, sometimes in 
conjunction with quota. In fact countries levy tariffs in a number of different ways: 
- As a percentage of the value of imports (ad valorem tariffs). This is the most 
straightforward form of a tariff.  
- As a monetary amount per unit of import such as cents per tonne (specific 
tariffs)  
- As a combination of the two, such as 12.5 percent plus 20 cents per tonne 
(compound tariffs)  
- Tariffs may also vary based on the time of year (seasonal tariffs). Seasonal 
tariffs are widespread in the EU’s imports of horticultural products, which 
essentially open  ‘import windows’ in exactly those periods when domestic 
production in the EU is low, and close the window through prohibitive 
tariffs when domestic production is high.   
- Tariffs may also be determined by complex technical factors (such as sugar 
or alcohol content). 
 
Specific tariffs are widespread in agriculture. In the USA and the EU about 44% 
of the agricultural tariff lines are specified in non-ad valorem terms. One advantage of 
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specific duties, from the importer’s perspective, is their administrative simplicity, 
since they avoid the problem of having to value imports. However, specific tariffs 
tend to discriminate against low-quality goods, as they place a heavier burden on 
lower priced items within a given tariff-line. Since developing country imports are 
often of a lower quality, and lower priced, than comparable goods originating from 
industrialized countries, specific tariffs tend to disadvantage developing country 
exporters.  
Contrary to ad valorem tariffs, the distortive effect of specific duties is difficult 
to determine. To estimate the ad valorem equivalent (AVE) of a specific tariff one 
needs transaction volumes as well as prices. The latter are usually difficult to obtain 
and typically display variations over time, in part due to exchange rate fluctuations.  
Gibson et al. (2001) estimate the average of bound agricultural tariffs across 113 
countries specified solely in ad valorem terms to be 58 percent, while the average 
AVE of non-ad valorem tariffs is 123 percent.  
 
Tariff-rate quota 
The Uruguay Round negotiations resulted in 'tariffication', which is the process 
of converting agricultural non-tariff barriers (NTBs). Variable import levies and 
import quotas were converted into bound tariffs (maximum tariffs set at established 
rates). Tariffication resulted in a more transparent tariff-based system of border 
protection that allowed for an initial set of tariff cuts.  
Since the conversion of NTBs into tariffs could lead to prohibitively high tariffs, 
GATT members agreed to provide a minimum level of import opportunities for 
products previously protected by NTBs. This was accomplished by creating tariff-rate 
quotas (TRQs), which generally impose a relatively low tariff (in-quota) on imports 
up to a specified level, with imports above that level subject to a higher tariff (over-
quota).   
According to Gibson et al. (2001) only about 6% of the agricultural tariff lines 
are subject to TRQs, and 33 out of the 133 countries in their study use this instrument. 
However, TRQs are typically applied in ‘sensitive’ products, meats, dairy and cereals, 
and therefore are a significant factor in global trade. The effects of TRQs are difficult 
to ascertain, as either the in-quota tariff, the quota level or the out-of quota tariff may 
be binding. In addition, the process of administration and the allocation of the TRQ to 
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specific exporters increases the non-transparancy of this system. As with any 
quantitative market restriction, TRQs give rise quota rents, that may accrue to the 
importer, the exporter or is shared amongst them. (De Gorter, 200..) 
The average over-quota tariff in Gibson et al. (2001) equals 128%, with peaks 
running as high as 250%. This shows that countries tend to use TRQs on products that 
they whish to protect from international competition. The average in-quota tariff of 
63% is in line with the average agricultural tariff. 
 
Preferences 
While the negotiation in the GATT/WTO concern market access conditions on a 
Most Favoured Nation (MFN)  basis, i..e non-discrimination amongst  trading 
partners, a web of preferential agreements governs most South-North trade (GSP, 
ACP, EBA, AGOA etc.). These agreements typically provide preferential access, i.e. 
at lower than MFN rates, to industrialized markets, but often ‘sensitive’ agricultural 
products are excluded from such agreements. The existence of preferences implies a 
priori that multilateral reductions on an MFN basis reduce the value of these 
preferences, see Bouët et al. 2004b for an empirical study, and Achterbosch et al. 
(2004) for an analysis for Africa.  
However, there are big question marks as to the utilization of preferences. Low 
utilisation rates may result from administrative complexity, and associated costs, 
information deficiencies and from complex rules of origin. Since preferential trade 
agreements provide member countries reductions on tariffs, rules of origin are needed 
in order to establish whether a give good is actually eligible for duty reductions. 
These rules of origin are usually extremely detailed and complex, and may contribute 
to the low level of preference utilisation. 
Obviously, if preferences are not effectively utilized to begin with, then erosion 
is less of an issue. Instead, preferential regimes should be more transparent and less 
restrictive. For example rules of origin should be simplified (Augier et al., 2004).  
 
The bottom-line: estimates of protection 
With all the usual caveats on providing aggregate measures of trade protection, 
we present here estimates of applied trade protection for broad country groups. 
Estimated tariffs are from the MacMaps database which is a joint effort by the Centre 
 6
d’études Prospectives et d’information Internationales (CEPII) and the International 
Trade Centre (WTO/ITC). This database is used to convert tariffs applying to trade in 
products measured at a very disaggregate level (HS6) into their ad valorem 
equivalent. The import protection measures include ad valorem tariffs, specific tariffs, 
quota, tariff rate quota regimes, and anti-dumping duties. These are all converted into 
ad valorem equivalents. An important feature of this dataset is its inclusion of existing 
trade preferences, including GSP, ACP, AGOA and existing bilateral preferences. See 
Bouët et al (2004a) for a comprehensive documentation. 
Figure 1 provides a summary view of the tariff landscape. It compares the 
simple average across products of ad valorem tariff equivalents levied by a country 
group (on their imports) to the average tariff faced (by their exporters) in this country 
group1.  
                                                 
1 It is generally difficult to derive a good measure of average tariffs. One well-known problem 
relates to the use of trade weights. If tariffs are weighted by their corresponding trade flows, the 
average tends to be lowered in case very high tariffs prohibit trade to occur (the endogeneity problem). 
On the other hand, simple average may put too much weight on high tariffs if the corresponding trade 
flow is rather small. In our case, the averages are somewhat hybrid: first, the original data is aggregated 
from the HS-6 level using basically unweighted averages to arrive at averages per GTAP commodity 
(seee Bouët et al., 2004). From the GTAP commodity level, we calculate the trade-weighted averages 
for all products and all regions, using bilateral imports as weighting factor, and excluding intra-regional 
trade. This takes into account the importance of a particular trade flow between any pair of trading 
partners. We then proceed to calculate simple unweighted averages across products. An alternative 
measure would be the calculation of import duties (and quota rents) collected.  
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Figure 1. Average tariffs imposed and average tariffs faced by exporters 
Source: GTAP database 6.3 (pre-release, June 2004), calculations LEI 
 
On average, trade barriers on agri-food products are higher than those on 
manufacturing products, and this holds for all countries and country groups 
considered. Note that we have included tariffs on textiles and clothing in the 
calculations for the manufacturing products, which raises the averages in this product 
group. The average ad valorem tariff on industrial goods alone in OECD countries is 
currently reduced to about 3%. The developing countries included in the chart tend to 
impose higher tariffs on their manufacturing imports than on agri-food products, 
reflecting their tendency to protect capital-intensive activities.  
In agri-food, the average tariffs levied by non-OECD countries appear to be 
smaller than the tariffs that their exporters have to pay, but there are exceptions to that 
rule. India, for example imposes higher protection on its imports of agri-food 
products, and Sub-Saharan Africa imposes relatively high protection on 
manufacturing imports while its exporters encounter low tariffs on their export 
destinations. This mainly reflects the preferential trade agreements with the EU. 
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Within the OECD countries there is some variation in the tariff profiles. 
Generally, the agri-food exporters Australia and New Zealand charge low tariffs on 
food imports. Canada protects mainly its dairy markets and this is reflected in a 
comparatively high average tariff. On the other hand, the average agri-food tariffs in 
the EU-15 are above 20%, and those for Japan are on average in excess of 90%, 
reflecting the extremely high protection in the rice market, ruminant meat and sugar. 
Since most trade occurs between OECD economies, the agricultural exporters face 
high tariffs on average on their export markets.  
In summary, the picture emerging is that developing countries tend to protect 
their manufacturing more than their agriculture. However, within the group of 
developing countries, the picture is mixed. Some face higher tariffs than others on 
their export markets, reflecting existing preferential agreements. Also, the patterns of 
protection afforded to their domestic producers through trade barriers differ, and it is 
impossible to infer a priori conclusions as to the likely effects of globally lower trade 
barriers.  
Zooming in on the Sub-Sahara Africa (SSA) region, Table 1 shows both the 
protection encountered by SSA exporters and the protection imposed by that region, 
broken down into broad commodity groups. Again, we use the AVEs derived form 
the MacMAps database. It appears that preferential arrangements with the EU and the 
USA lead to rather low trade barriers encountered by SSA exporters, except for sugar 
and ruminant meat in the EU. In fact, most agri-food products enter these two 
important markets at rather low tariffs. The preferences afforded to SSA extend to 
Manufactures and Textiles and clothing. On the other hand, the SSA region itself 
maintains high tariffs against imports from all destinations, including intra-regional 
trade. These facts combined point to potentially little gains from improved access to 
OECD markets, while the reduction of import protection of SSA’s own markets could 
potentially increase trade flows into that region. 
Even more interesting than the measurement of levels of protection is the effect 
of a reduction of protective measures. Table 2 provides estimates of the effects on 
regional export earnings (including intra-regional trade) after a halving of existing 
import barriers. This scenario clearly increases global trade, and all regions will see 
their export revenues rising. However, agricultural liberalisation contributes only a 
small share compared to non-agricultural liberalisation efforts. This is mainly to 
explained from the larger trade volumes and –values involved in manufacturing trade. 
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It is especially interesting to see that non-agricultural liberalisation by non-OECD 
countries yields the highest export revenue gains amongst the group of non-OECD 
countries. This is due to two mutually enforcing factors: a) developing countries have 
relatively high barriers against industrial goods, and b) they maintain relatively high 
barriers against each other’s imports. These facts combined lead to a growth in South-
South trade after liberalisation, and consequent rises in export revenues. An exception 
is Sub-Sahara Africa, as this region would even experience revenue losses from 
lowering manufacturing trade barriers by OECD countries on an MFN basis. 
Preference erosion plays a crucial role in this regard. See Achterbosch et al. (2004) for 
a detailed analysis of the African situation. 
Table 3 illustrates the implications for South-South trade by showing the growth 
rates of bilateral export values following a 50% reduction in all border measures and 
domestic support. Generally, trade within the group of countries grows faster than 
their total exports, indicating a significant rise in South-South trade. Only Malawi and  
the Rest of SSA are exceptions, who see intra-regional trade shrinking in the Southern 
African region. Noteworthy is the trade performance of China, Indonesia and India, 
especially with regard to their trade with Brazil.  
Table 1: Pattern of Sub-Sahara Africa import protection: encountered and 
imposed 
 Trade protection 
encountered by Sub-
Sahara Africa, % 
Trade protection applied by Sub-
Saharan Africa, % 
 EU USA EU USA Brazil Sub-Sahara 
Africa 
Rice 0 8.5 10 6 0 12
Vegetables & Fruit 1.6 0.4 18.3 20.7 3.9 25.4
Plant based fibres 0 2.9 11.2 10.5 16.9 4.9
Wheat 0 1.8 6 7.4 5 10.8
Coarse grains 0.2 0 8.3 15.5 6.1 6.3
Oilseeds 0 1.8 11.4 13.2 0 4
Dairy 4.1 6 13.9 15.5 0.5 14.2
Sugar 114.2 29 18.4 22.5 14.6 25.3
Ruminant meat 84.7 0.3 11.7 7.7 11.3 13.5
Other meat 6.1 0.3 26.8 25.1 24.9 20.3
Processed food 0.3 1.3 30 19.8 20.5 17.5
Manufactures 0 0 13.8 12 16.7 5.9
Textiles & leather 0 11.6 27 30.4 20.7 7.4
Source: GTAP database 6.3 (pre-release, June 2004), calculations LEI 
Note: “EU” refers to the EU-15, Sub-Sahara Africa includes data on: Botswana, Rest of South African 
CU (excl. South Africa), Mozambique, Tanzania, Zambia, Zimbabwe, Rest of SADC, Madagascar, 
Uganda, Rest of Sub-Saharan Africa 
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Table 2: Improved market access and export revenues, % growth from 2001 base 
 Total Import tariffs 
agriculture 
OECD 
Import tariffs 
agriculture 
non-OECD 
Import tariffs 
non-
agriculture 
OECD 
Import tariffs 
non-
agriculture 
non-OECD 
OECD   
  
Australia/New 
Zealand 
3.13 0.72 0.09 2.19 0.13
  Canada 0.21 0.38 0.03 -0.11 -0.09
  European 
Union 15 
0.86 0.18 0.05 0.22 0.41
  Japan 4.51 0.8 0.08 1.98 1.65
  Mexico 2.23 0.59 0.02 1.46 0.16
  Turkey 2.72 0.11 0.64 0.23 1.74
  United States 2.9 0.28 0.12 1.71 0.79
  rest OECD 2.99 0.69 0.05 1.69 0.56
   
Non-OECD   
  Brazil 7.35 0.22 0.37 0.96 5.8
  China 7.16 0.15 0.22 1.66 5.13
  Indonesia 3.66 0.01 0.4 1.02 2.23
  India 17.58 -0.02 2.29 1 14.31
  Malawi 7.13 3.54 1.15 0.17 2.27
  Russia 3.03 0.01 0.55 0.63 1.84
  South Africa 3.13 0.03 0.46 0.15 2.49
  rest SS Africa 6.25 0.11 1.88 -0.19 4.45
  rest of World 4.1 0.09 0.83 0.39 2.79
Source: Model calculations LEI 
 
Table 3: Liberalization and South-South trade, % growth of exports from 2001 base 
 
Destination 
 
 
 
Source 
  
Brazil 
  
China 
  
Indonesia 
  
India
  
Malawi
  
South 
Africa
 Rest 
SS 
Africa
Within 
group, 
South-
South 
growth
Total 
exports 
growth, all 
destinations 
Change 
total value 
of exports, 
all 
destinations, 
million USD
 Brazil 0 7 3 15 0 17 12 9 8 5077
 China 23 0 12 26 22 18 21 20 7 28321
 Indonesia 17 7 0 28 25 8 41 16 4 2947
 India 24 19 20 0 26 26 34 26 18 10619
 Malawi 33 0 0 0 0 13 -22 -7 8 52
 South 
Africa 
7 1 6 50 16 0 -10 4 3 1317
 rest SS 
Africa 
-11 -1 8 19 5 -5 -1 2 6 4267
Source: Model calculations LEI 
Note: simulation experiment involves 50% reduction of all border measures and 
domestic support 
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Our model also allows us to estimate national income effects, based on the 
concept of equivalent variation. The world income effects amount to 0.1% of world 
GDP, of which the lion’s share (71%) accrues to OECD countries. For non-OECD 
countries as a group, non-agricultural liberalisation by OECD countries appears to be 
more important than agricultural trade liberalisation, but this is largely dominated by 
the results for China. For India, on the other hand, non-agricultural market access in 
non-OECD countries is expected to bring the highest gains, especially through 
allocative efficiency gains of realized through India’s own liberalisation efforts. For 
some individual non-OECD countries, agricultural trade liberalisation can potentially 
bring significant income gains, especially for exporting regions such as Brazil.  
National income effects provide a good summary measure of economy-wide 
gains from improved market access. Of course, the distribution within countries and 
between population groups is very important as well. In relation to food security, the 
access to food is amongst other things depending on purchasing power, which in turn 
will be determined by the developments of wages, non-wage incomes and the 
developments of food prices. Table 4 shows some indicators from model simulations.  
While agricultural factor returns develop favourably compared to non-
agricultural returns in the agricultural exporting countries that currently have low 
levels of protection, relative agricultural returns decline in highly protected markets 
and in SSA. This change in relative returns will tend to result in a shifting of 
resources away from agriculture and food production in those regions. However, food 
purchasing power for those households that depend mainly on labour for their 
incomes is increasing in most regions, as domestic food prices fall with reduced 
protection.  
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Table 4: Liberalisation and purchasing power  
Real factor returns agriculture vs 
non-agriculture, % (*) 
Food Purchasing power of labour-
dependent households, % (**) 
OECD 
Australia/New 
Zealand
5.18 -1.08
Canada 0.72 0.06
European Union 15 -3.78 1.22
Japan -3.60 3.12
Mexico -1.45 1.05
Turkey 0.54 0.46
United States -0.15 -0.34
rest of OECD -3.29 4.97
non-OECD 
Brazil 2.90 -0.58
China 0.73 0.35
Indonesia 0.74 0.44
India -1.26 1.01
Malawi 3.37 0.17
Russia -1.02 1.60
South Africa 1.09 0.70
rest of Sub-Saharan 
Africa
-0.45 1.32
rest of World 0.23 1.19
Source: model calculations LEI 
Notes: Simulations assume a multilateral 50% cut in all border protection and domestic support in all 
sectors (*) defined as the percent change of the real return to primary factors (labour and capital) 
employed in agriculture minus the percent change of those factors in non-agricultural activities. (**) 
Defined as the percent change in factor incomes minus the percent change of food prices. 
 
Improved market access leads to various global and domestic responses. As 
import protection is lowered production in protected regions and sectors tends to 
decline and international prices tend to rise. In previously protected regions, more 
food at lower prices will become available and this should lead to increased food 
consumption, although price and income elasticities for food items are typically rather 
low in developed economies. Table 5 shows estimates of the impact of a 50% 
reduction in import protection on aggregate food consumption, broken down by 
agriculture and non-agriculture and broken down by the broad regions implementing 
the policy change.  Obviously, the aggregate effects on food consumption are rather 
small overall. Improved market access to OECD markets does have a negligible effect 
on food consumption in Southern Africa, indicating that in this model simulation 
there is not a diversion of food from domestic markets to exports. To the contrary, in 
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this simulation we observe a decline of food exports form that region to OECD 
markets as a consequence of preference erosion. However, if the countries in the 
Southern African region were to lower there own import protection, we would 
observe a slight rise in food consumption, due to lower domestic prices and increased 
availability of foods through imports. 
 
Table 5: Market access and change in food consumption, % 
 Import tariffs 
agriculture 
OECD 
Import tariffs 
agriculture 
non-OECD 
Import tariffs 
non-agriculture 
OECD 
Import tariffs 
non-
agriculture 
non-OECD 
Total 
OECD   
 Australia/New 
Zealand 
-0.27 -0.04 -0.10 -0.01 -0.41
  Canada 1.09 -0.07 -0.14 -0.02 0.86
  European 
Union 15 
0.83 -0.10 -0.05 0.08 0.77
  Japan 1.50 0.01 0.05 0.08 1.63
  Mexico 0.45 -0.03 -0.02 0.01 0.41
  Turkey -0.02 0.26 0.05 0.21 0.50
  United States 0.01 -0.07 -0.08 0.01 -0.13
  rest OECD 2.23 -0.07 0.06 0.18 2.40
Non-OECD   
  Brazil -0.21 0.07 0.09 -0.06 -0.11
  China -0.10 0.13 0.16 -0.09 0.11
  Indonesia -0.04 -0.02 0.18 0.03 0.15
  India 0.00 0.35 0.03 -0.06 0.32
  Malawi 0.69 0.02 0.02 0.11 0.85
  Russia 0.06 0.65 0.11 -0.09 0.73
  South Africa -0.04 0.30 0.01 0.08 0.35
  rest SS Africa 0.04 0.36 -0.07 -0.22 0.11
  rest of World -0.03 0.41 0.06 -0.10 0.35
Source: model calculations LEI 
Note: Simulation experiment involves a 50% reduction the AVE of import measures 
relative to 2001 base levels. 
 
 
4. Not just tariffs and quota: sanitary and phytosanitary requirements and 
private standards 
The picture painted above provides only a partial view of the agricultural market 
access landscape. Consumers in industrialised countries demand safe food of 
guaranteed high quality and the food industry as well as public policy has responded 
to these demands through a variety of measures over the past 10 years (OECD, 2000). 
The objective of safe food consumption addresses agents and procedures along the 
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entire food chain, from production and processing to marketing and control – in short, 
from farm to table. 
Developing countries are generally more concerned with food security (i.e. there 
being sufficient nutrients available for the population) than food safety for 
consumers.2 However, from the developing country perspective, food safety issues 
have important implications for export opportunities to countries with a low risk 
tolerance. To reduce the intrinsic risk in the global trading of food and other 
agricultural products, these products are confronted with technical requirements at the 
multilateral, country and business level. There is reason for concern that non-tariff 
barriers to trade (NTBs) related to food safety may systematically and substantially 
impede export performance of developing countries.  
In a sense, developing countries are prone to being excluded from the 
optimisation process regarding food safety measures: compliance with increasingly 
strict standards of food safety involves innovations and costs. Alternatively, in the 
case of non-compliance, exporters bear costs in the form of a loss of market outlet, 
temporarily at the least but with likely long-term consequences.  
Food safety measures give rise to industrial organisation issues of market and 
competition structure, as producers in developing countries are forced to adjust 
processes in the product chain to prevent a loss of trade. Process changes are directed 
towards (1) compliance with multilateral and country-specific minimum safety 
standards in trade and (2) solving the information problem that arises when the extent 
to which food is safe is unobservable to buyers. It appears that adjustments in the food 
sector are strongly influenced by a trend towards integration of the product chain 
under retailer control. Safe production of safe food in developing countries appears to 
be unfavourable to smallholders. One reason is that decentralised supply may become 
an obstacle to solve information problems, one answer to which is traceability. 
 
                                                 
2 Nonetheless, in developing countries food-borne diseases imply a major risk, especially for young 
children – an issue intangibly related to the absence of basic hygiene and safe water supply. 
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Sanitary and phytosanitary measures 
The agreement on sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) measures under the WTO serves 
as the main framework for the regulation of food safety issues.3 It governs the 
conditions for lawful risk reducing – but trade distorting – measures, and the 
settlement of disputes over these measures. SPS measures are shortly defined as 
“…regulations adopted by a nation to protect human, animal, or plant life and health 
within its territory from certain enumerated biological and toxicological risks” 
(Roberts et al., 1999). 
Each WTO member may determine a level of acceptable health risk (or safety) 
and impose technical requirements on imports to maintain that level. It is required that 
such measures be justified with scientific assessment of the risk and imposed strictly 
to address this risk. By agreement, countries should acknowledge that various 
methods for food safety assurance could produce equivalent safeguards against health 
risks. Barriers imposed may cause disputes to arise in the multilateral trading system, 
and bilateral conflicts are brought before a Dispute Settlement Body under the WTO. 
 Each country’s assessment of human, animal and plant health risks effectively 
determines the access of foreign food products to the domestic market. For that reason 
the WTO stimulates members to exchange information on risk and harmonise 
measures with one of three international advisory organisations: on animal health 
issues, the International Organization of Epizootics (IOE), on phytosanitary matters 
the International Plant Protection Convention (IPPC), and on issues with direct impact 
on consumer health the Codex Alimentarius Commission (Codex).  
Long-term goals of harmonisation and justification of food safety measures in 
trade under multilateral bodies should enhance the transparency of the multilateral 
trading system, reduce costs, and increase trade. The current reality is that global food 
safety regulation is one label to cover a multilateral consensus-agreement, a load of 
national rules and principles in the developed economy markets, and a strain for 
                                                 
3 Other relevant requirements to food trade are defined in the former GATT agreement on technical 
barriers to trade (TBT), now under the WTO. The TBT articles stand to the SPS requirements as food 
quality to food safety: the latter regulates a scientifically defined element of risk in the former. 
Consequently, the SPS agreement effectively is more restrictive on food trade flows than the TBT 
agreement which regulates issues more or less confined to labelling, nutrition requirements, packaging 
and the like. 
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developing countries. Only to keep track of these processes requires substantial 
financial and human resources for negotiation committee delegates, Codex contact 
points, laboratory research etc; the actual setting of standards and shaping of rules are 
definitely biased against developing countries. On grassroots level, reports from 
selected developing countries are that communication on technical requirements, if 
accurate, is often too complex and too technical to be used for guidance in ensuring 
compliance of exports with import requirements (see De Jager and Smelt, 2001; 
SADC, 2000). 
 
Private food safety standards 
Enterprises in the food sector have incorporated consumer concerns regarding 
health and quality into their production, marketing and distribution activities. The 
core of large retailers and trans-national “agribusiness” corporations has introduced 
various technical specifications that govern quality and safety of local and imported 
food products. Examples are the guidelines from EurepGAP, a European retailers 
convention, and British Retail Consortium. Insofar as these requirements or product 
standards relate to food safety, they usually do so within a broader concept of 
marketing differentiation and efficiency enhancement. (Reardon and Farina, 2001; 
Reardon et al., 2001).  
Private (or “voluntary”) food safety standards are at least in two ways related to 
official government measures and legislation. Private standards (a) tend to be more 
stringent than officially required, so as to stay abreast of public regulation;4 (b) may 
be based on government indications, as is often the case regarding the labels on food 
products. Market power is crucial in determining what the standard will be – and to 
non-complying products little or no trade is left. In sum, increased value-added of 
safer food, enhanced market power and reduced costs may render it rational for 
private agents to address the health externality involved in food consumption with 
private safety standards. 
 
                                                 
4 See, e.g., De Jager and Smelt (2001) for EU legislation on pesticide residues with effectively no 
impact on the Zambian export market because of the stringency of standards enforced by a large 
retailer. 
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5. Market access also means integration into globally operating chains 
As the Dutch presidency of the EU in its document for the informal meeting of 
Ministers 5-7 September 2004 put it: “In the globalisation process, the food and 
agricultural industry has moved from independent producers and marketing firms to 
integrated and multinational supply chains.”  
While food safety issues need not worsen agricultural export potential in 
developing countries, related reorganisations of the export supply chain, mostly 
induced by retailer consortia in developed economy markets, are likely to have a 
significant impact on rural labour and producer markets. It is clear that private 
standards within the globally operating food chains do not work in favour of 
smallholders who will find it difficult to make the necessary investments to comply 
with those standards. Consequently, the international sourcing of food products is 
increasingly organised in tightly controlled vertical chains. Having access to the chain 
provides the ticket to export earnings for developing country farmers.   
On the other hand, access to markets also comprises access to local and 
domestic markets in developing countries. In spite of the global integration process, it 
is still the case that large portions of the rural population in developing countries are 
not connected to markets due to a variety of institutional and infrastructural 
impediments. Access to national markets for inputs, such as fertilizers, pesticides and 
seed, as well as access to output markets and access to labour markets has an 
enormous potential to improve the livelihoods of the poor in developing countries.  
Poor landowners can benefit either as independent producers, or as contracted 
producers or outgrowers. For growers with little access to land the growing activities 
are often part of a strategy to diversify sources of income (IFAD 2001). Especially 
horticulture seems to be a promising area for income earnings. Horticulture requires 
more handling than staple crops in order to accommodate for their more perishable 
quality and for often stronger quality requirements in the market. The processing, 
distribution and marketing of fruits and vegetables provides many low-skilled labour 
opportunities to the poor. Across the developing world unskilled women are favoured 
for these seasonal contracts, often at above-average wages.5  
                                                 
5 For information on the role of horticulture in poverty alleviation, see the Pro Poor Horticulture project website 
www.growoutofpoverty.nl. 
 
 18
Kuiper and van Tongeren (2004) provide another example on the linkages 
between world markets and the village economy. They show in a case study for just 
one Chinese village that trade liberalization in the wake of China’s WTO accession 
has very significant impacts on the allocation decisions within households and 
between households within the village. Price changes affect the labour intensity of 
rice production as households switch between intensive two-season and one-season 
rice in response to changes in their shadow wages. Outside village employment 
opportunities induce a less labour intensive rice cropping. The consequent drop in 
demand for traction services reduces cash income for those households that do not 
have access to migration and thus economic growth in coastal areas affects them 
indirectly through the village factor market. The effects of rural-urban migration 
therefore go far beyond the transfer of cash to those family members that stay behind. 
At the same time, it is clear that increased food production, growing populations 
and rapid urban expansion lead to higher claims on natural resources for domestic and 
industrial use. Especially in fragile ecological areas this process can lead to a 
downward spiral that undermines the natural resource base and hence endangers the 
livelihoods of current and future generations. While market-based solutions to these 
challenges are not always available, greater economic prosperity allows countries to 
better cope with these challenges. 
In short, the concept of market access needs to be broadened beyond the narrow 
definition of reducing  both conventional (tariffs and quota) and new (standards) 
barriers to international trade to include access to local and national markets in 
developing countries.  
 
 
6. Conclusions 
Agricultural market access in the post-Uruguay round era is characterized by a 
complex web of arrangements, which typically results in higher levels of applied 
protection than in industrial goods. This is true for both industrial countries and 
developing countries, and explains in part why the agricultural negotiations in the 
current Doha round receive much attention.  
Market access to OECD agricultural markets is not only hampered by 
‘conventional’ policy instruments such as tariffs and quota, but to an increasing 
degree through technical and sanitary standards. Standard-setting is not confined to 
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public policy: increasingly important are private standards set by internationally 
operating food supply chains. 
Lowering tariffs and expanding quota in OECD economies alone will not lead to 
dramatically increased prosperity and improved food security in DCs. Trade policy 
changes in DCs are expected to bring higher benefits to those countries than policy 
changes implemented by OECD countries. In addition, complementary domestic 
policies in the areas of infrastructure and trade facilitation are a necessary 
prerequisite, as has recently been emphasized by the United Nations Economic 
Commission for Africa in the Economic Report von Africa 2004 (UNECA, 2004). For 
large parts of the rural population in DCs, ‘market access’ first and foremost means 
access to local and national markets for outputs and inputs. In terms of access to 
international markets, it is becoming increasingly important to integrate into 
internationally operating food chains. Consequently, the lowering of tariffs and 
expansion of quota by OECD countries that might be negotiated in the ongoing Doha 
round covers only a just a small fraction of the issues. One can wonder whether it 
covers the most relevant issues from a development perspective.   
This does not make the WTO obsolete, however. To the contrary, the 
development of a rule-based system that governs international trade can act as a 
catalyst to improve the prospects for developing countries in a variety of ways. First 
and foremost, the legal framework of the GATT and the WTO makes international 
trade relations less arbitrary and gives even the smallest developing country 
instruments to pursue its trade interests.  Second, the legal international framework 
provides an ’anchor’ and a rationale for national policies that are better targeted at 
economic development.  Redesign of agricultural policies in the EU during the 
Uruguay Round and during the ongoing Doha round provides a good example of the 
interplay between international negotiations and national policymaking. 
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